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WHO WILL SPEAK FOR THE CHILDREN?: FINDING A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
Rebecca E. Baneman
For these are all our children. We will all profit by, or pay for, whatever
they become.
-James Baldwin'
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, states remove thousands of children from their birth
parents due to abuse or neglect.2 If close relatives cannot provide
adequately for them, the children enter the foster-care system, in
which the state child-welfare agency, in conjunction with a family-
court judge, finds alternative, or foster, homes for them. The agency
sets a goal for the child to work toward: reunification with the birth
parents, adoption, or independent living. Foster homes are meant as
stations along the way to that goal.
Family courts in each of the fifty states approve, and periodically
review, foster-care placements. 4 Ajudge makes decisions whether and
how to place the child in care. At review hearings, the judge can de-
cide whether a current placement is acceptable, order changes, or
otherwise provide for the child's basic needs. If state-law require-
ments are met, the judge will also hold a termination-of-parental-
rights hearing. If parental rights are terminated, the child is free for
adoption.
J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2004, Yale University.
Concert program to benefit the Wiltwyck School for Boys (as quoted in Fox BUTrERFIELD,
ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF VIOLENCE, at vii
(1996)).
2 See generally Laura A. Harper, Note, The State's Duty to Children in Foster Care: Bearing the
Burden of Protecting Children, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 793, 793 (2003) (providing background on the
foster care system).
Cf Jane Ranum, Minnesota's Permanency and Concurrent Planning Child Welfare System, 26
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 687, 688-89 (2000) (explaining the Minnesota child-welfare system's
.permanency planning" in which if reunification with a birth parent is unlikely, the system will
concurrently pursue adoption and other long-term placements).
4 See Harper, supra note 2, at 796 (describing typical statutory criteria in state foster-care
systems).
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Foster-care proceedings are critical to the families whose fate they
determine, yet they are almost always chaotic affairs. Judges have
long dockets. Key players, including the subject child, are often ab-
sent from the courtroom-the hearings take place during the school
day and can be traumatic. Social-work records can be troublingly in-
complete.
Law guardians-counsel for the children in foster care-are often
vital to informing the court of both the facts and the child's prefer-
ences regarding his or her placement. Law guardians speak for chil-
dren in foster care, children who desperately need a voice.'
In this Comment, I ask whether there is a constitutional right to
counsel for children in foster care, and if so where in the current
federal constitutional jurisprudence such a right is located. Ulti-
mately, this Comment calls on the Supreme Court to adopt a consti-
tutional right to counsel for children in foster care, as recognized by
a recent decision by the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia. Such a right is based in a procedural due process liberty
analysis.
Part II will provide a short history of the child-welfare system. In
Part III, I will argue that, from a policy standpoint, counsel for chil-
dren in the foster-care system is a timely and extremely significant is-
sue; children all over the country are suffering in inadequate place-
ments, in part because they do not have effective representation in
the family-court system. In Part IV, I will examine children's rights in
foster care, beginning with a brief survey of federal statutory rights. I
will then consider in detail the constitutional right to counsel for de-
pendent children. I will evaluate the possible application of two
5 Law guardians, however, can only be effective counsel where they have appropriate
caseloads. In some counties in states across the country, law guardians cannot be effective law-
yers because their caseloads are prohibitively burdensome. In some instances, they have never
met their clients nor visited their placements. For example, a child-advocate lawyer in Georgia
recently "testified that she had 'failed to personally meet or speak with 90 percent of [her] own
clients [because of her burdensome caseload]' and that there are cases where no one ever re-
viewed the medical, social service, education, or other records for a child, met with the foster
care provider, or even met with the child." Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d
1353, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (internal citation omitted). In such cases, child clients effectively
have no voice in the system that is raising them, a system replete with abuses and dangers.
6 Id.
7 This Comment will focus only on the right to counsel, which is squarely procedural due
process, as opposed to substantive due process. The substantive due process rights of children
in foster care derive from a line of Supreme Court cases granting rights to people in different
types of civil institutions. Compare Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (holding that,
because the state owes a duty to those whom it has placed in its custody, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the state from being deliberately indifferent to the health or safety of a prisoner), and
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that a developmentally disabled man
involuntarily placed in a state mental institution had a right to "food, shelter, clothing, and
medical care" as well as "reasonable safety" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment), with DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
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sources of Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights: procedural
due process property and procedural due process liberty. I will then
explain why the Supreme Court should adopt a constitutional right to
counsel for children in foster care based on a procedural due process
liberty analysis as the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia recently found in Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue." The case
was decided under the Georgia State Constitution and not the Fed-
eral Constitution. I will argue, however, that the Kenny A. court's rea-
soning regarding the Georgia Constitution should also apply to the
question of the right to counsel under the Federal Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND: THE CHILD-WELFARE SYSTEM
The term child-welfare system describes the "network of state and
federal laws, civil courts, and social programs intended to protect
children from abuse and neglect by their caretakers."9 It has its roots
in the colonial period, when "local... authorities had the power to
seize vagrant and unruly children and indenture them to work for
their keep." 10 Throughout the nineteenth century, private charities
removed poor, mostly immigrant children from homes they consid-
ered unsafe."
Federal involvement in child welfare began during the New Deal
with the Social Security Act of 1935,"2 which provided funds for state
foster care. 3 Child abuse became a publicized issue in the 1960s, re-
(1989) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not impose an
affirmative duty on the state to act to preserve from harm the substantive due process interests
of individuals not in state custody). Recent cases on the substantive due process rights of chil-
dren in foster care include Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Texas Department of Protective and Regula-
tory Services, 380 F.3d 872 (5th Cir. 2004); Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079 (lth Cir. 2004); Lewis v.
Anderson, 308 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2002); and Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000) (en
banc). See generally County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840-42 (1998) (setting out the
operative framework for substantive due process claims).
8 See 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1359-61 (finding a right to counsel for plaintiff foster children in
deprivation and termination-of-parental-rights proceedings under the due process clause of the
Georgia Constitution).
9 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Abuse, the Constitution, and the Legacy of Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 479, 479 (2001). As mentioned, child-welfare proceedings
take place in civil, rather than criminal, court. Social reformers thought domestic violence was
a social-welfare problem, which required a social-welfare, rather than criminal, response. See
Richard J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz, Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 95,
98-99 (1999) (noting that social-welfare institutions, not criminal courts, have authority over
the majority of child-abuse and neglect cases).
to Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 479.
n See Patricia A. Schene, Past, Present, and Future Roles of Child Protective Services, FUTURE OF
CHILDREN, Spring 1998, at 23, 25 (examining the precursors to today's foster-care system).
12 Ch. 531, § 401, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 670 (2000)).
13 Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 479.
Jan. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
suiting in the 1974 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 14
which "t[ied] eligibility for federal funding to ... state[] adoption of
model legislation for reporting and investigating [child-abuse and
neglect] charges. '
Under current law, when the family court makes a determination
that the child cannot safely remain in his home, the state takes cus-
tody of the child and places her in foster care with a licensed foster
parent or in a group home with more stringent supervision. 16 Foster
parents typically receive a stipend to provide care for the child, while
a private agency supervises the family.' The agency contracts with
the state to oversee foster-care placements through caseworkers and,
in some instances, to house children with special behavior and emo-
tional needs.'8
Though the purpose of the foster-care system is to provide tempo-
rary and safe accommodations for children whose parents are unable
to care for them, the reality is troubling. As Laura Harper has ex-
plained, "[m]any foster children suffer abuse and neglect in foster
homes, in some cases much more severe than any they may have ex-
perienced in their [biological] homes."19 The National Foster Care
Education Project found in 1986 and 1990 that foster-care abuse rates
exceeded those for other children by tenfold. °  Program inade-
quacy-the failure of the system itself to provide adequately for chil-
dren's medical, psychological, and emotional needs-is also wide-
spread.2'
Abuses in the child-welfare system are as old as the system itself,
2
which shows "a remarkable immunity to reform."2 These abuses per-
sist "[d] espite congressional attempts at reform.2 4 A recent New York
Times opinion column described unconscionable shortcomings in
14 Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07
(2000)).
15 Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 479-80; accord Schene, supra note 11, at 27, 29.
16 See Harper, supra note 2, at 795-96.
17 See id. at 796.
is See Schene, supra note 11, at 30.
19 Harper, supra note 2, at 796.
20 Id. at 796-97.
21 See id. at 797 (defining "program abuse" as the system's failure to provide safe, stable
homes and "services to meet the child's medical, psychological, and emotional needs.")
22 For an investigation into one particular long-lived lawsuit against New York City's foster-
care system, see generally NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF WILDER THE EPIC STRUGGLE
TO CHANGE FOSTER CARE (Vintage Books 2002) (2001).
23 Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children
from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 199, 212 (1988).
24 See Harper, supra note 2, at 798 (referring to the failures of the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980), and its successor, the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)).
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Mississippi's Division of Family and Children Services.25 According to
the agency, a nineteen-month-old baby was beaten to death by a fa-
ther in DeSoto County.26 Although national guidelines call for
agency caseworkers to have caseloads of twelve to seventeen, some
caseworkers in Mississippi have one hundred or more.27 In one
county, the average is 130.28 Most shockingly, there is testimony in
evidence collected by Children's Rights, an impact litigation group
that is suing the state of Mississippi, that "a key official in the De-
partment of Human Services... said the state would 'not necessarily
investigate' whether sexual abuse had occurred if a 'little girl' con-
tracted a sexually transmitted disease."29 In a New Jersey case that
made national headlines in 2003, four brothers were discovered starv-
ing in a foster home. 30 NewJersey's Department of Youth and Family
Services had visited the home thirty-eight times in four years, but no
one had reported the malnourishment." By the time the children
were removed, their "teeth had decayed" and their "stomachs were
distended."0
2
There are many explanations for the abuses. The child-welfare
system is poorly organized and under-funded. 3 The private agencies
that contract with the city are understaffed, and their employees are
underpaid 4 As a result, there is a remarkably high turnover of staff,
resulting in a lack of continuity for the children with whom they
work. Furthermore, "foster parents often receive inadequate train-
ing" to deal with the severe emotional and behavior problems of
many of their wards.35
As a result of these flagrant and systemic tragedies, dependent
children and their advocates are "increasingly... turning to the
courts for protection,"36 which makes the right to, and role of, coun-
sel in dependency proceedings an essential issue.
25 Bob Herbert, Op-Ed, Gross Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2006, at A21.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Children's Rights, Why Our Work Matters, http://www.childrensrights.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=jacksonbrothers (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
31 Id.
32 Id.
3 Harper, supra note 2, at 797.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 798.
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
At first blush, the importance, or even appropriateness, of counsel
for children in foster care might not be evident. As a matter of insti-
tutional competence, one might argue that the abuses illustrated
above should be addressed either by the executive, since the child-
welfare system is administered by an agency, or by the legislature,
since the various state legislatures promulgated the statutes that pro-
vide for child-welfare agencies. Furthermore, a court in a depend-
ency proceeding is charged with seeking the "best interests" of the
child. Surely, one might argue, a court convened for the purpose of
protecting a child will make a conscientious and informed social-
welfare decision, regardless of the presence of counsel. Ideally, the
family court achieves a balance between parents' constitutional rights
to be free from undue interference in child r . 3t  e feefro i trf  i chldrearing and dependent
children's rights to be free from harm."
Yet, in reality, effective representation is essential.3 There are
nearly half a million children living in foster-care placements across
the country,4° a number that taxes an under-resourced system. Family
court judges have full dockets and feel pressure to move proceedings
quickly. A city or state child-welfare agency, represented by counsel
at a foster-care hearing, has similarly divided loyalties. The agency is
concerned not only with the child's interest but also with the efficient
functioning of its own bureaucracy. The court cannot rely on a city
welfare agency to act in the child's best interest when a status-quo
placement might be convenient for the agency. Moreover, the par-
ent, who is often represented by counsel, has interests that do not
necessarily align with the child's in a dependency proceeding.
Further, it is not enough for a state to assign an attorney; the state
must assign an effective attorney. The National Association of Counsel
37 A line of Supreme Court cases have come to stand for the proposition that parents have a
fundamental right, rooted in Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence, to
decisional autonomy regarding their children. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)
(holding that "a State's interest in universal education" must be balanced against parents' inter-
ests in their children's "religious upbringing"); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518
(1924) (finding a fundamental right for parents to make decisions about private school atten-
dance); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (establishing liberty of parents and
guardians to control the upbringing and education of their children).
58 Gelles & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 95-96.
39 I use representation to mean the assistance of a lawyer. Some states allow nonlawyer volun-
teers to speak for dependent children. Any adult voice is certainly preferable to no adult voice
on the child's behalf. But child welfare proceedings, despite their benevolent social-welfare
purposes, are legal proceedings, where lawyers provide representation more effectively than
others. I believe a child is best served by an attorney.
40 Harper, supra note 2, at 793.
41 But see Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (refusing to find a constitu-
tional right to counsel for parents in termination-of-parental-rights hearings).
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for Children recommends that, in order to perform effectively, a
child-advocate attorney should represent no more than a hundred
clients at a time, assuming such an "attorney... spend[s] an average
of 20 hours representing each child and will work 2000 hours in a
year. 42 As noted in Kenny A., to be discussed at length infra, child ad-
vocate attorneys in DeKalb County, Georgia, each represented two
hundred clients.4 3 In Fulton County, every child advocate attorney
represented nearly 450 children.44 These children effectively had no
voice in their foster-care proceedings, and consequently abuses
abounded. In both settings, the state foster-care agency, faced with "a
shortage of family foster homes[,] ... place[d] children in inappro-
priate and overcrowded homes, [moved children multiple times,]
and overuse [d] institutional placements."
4 5
IV. RIGHTS OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
A. Statutory: CAPTA
The 1974 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
("CAPTA")46 "established a statutory right to representation, although
not necessarily by counsel, for all children who are the subjects of
child protection proceedings."47 Specifically, Congress made the re-
ceipt of federal funds contingent on the provision of a guardian ad
litem ("GAL") for every subject child of abuse or neglect proceed-
ings.4 s Congress amended the statute in 1996 to clarify that the GAL
could be an attorney, a Court Appointed Special Advocate ("CASA"),
or both.49 The statute further specified that the purpose of the ap-
pointment is to obtain a clear understanding of the situation and
needs of the child, and to make recommendations regarding the
"best interests of the child."50  Congress provided "[n]o fur-
ther... guidance [about the scope] or the purpose of the represen-
tation.,
5 1
42 Kenny A. exrelWinn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
43 Id.
4Id.
45 Id. at 1359 n.6.
46 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c (2000)).
47 Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of Whether Young Children in Child Protection Pro-
ceedings Should Be Represented ly Lauyers, 32 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 1 (2000).
48 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a)(1)(A) (2000).
49 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235,
sec. 107, § 107(b)(2)(A)(ix), 110 Stat. 3063, 3073 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106a(b) (2) (A) (ix) (2000)).
50 Id.
51 Mandelbaum, supra note 47, at 2-3.
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Although it was an important step, the passage of CAPTA did not
result in the provision of counsel for all children in foster care. The
statute did not guarantee "counsel," but rather "representation."
When a child is not represented by an attorney, he is almost always
represented by a CASA. "Almost every state. . . has [a CASA] pro-
gram," which trains laymen to be advocates for dependent children.
Though these are certainly important programs, whether lay advo-
cates have the legal knowledge and advocacy skills to adequately rep-
resent the interests of abused or neglected children is an open ques-
tion.54
Furthermore, CAPTA does not require effective assistance of coun-
sel. Congress did not set a maximum caseload for GALs. As a result,
in many states children have counsel, but due to the representatives'
overwhelming number of clients they cannot be effective.
Besides caseload issues, CAPTA presents effective-counsel problems
because it mandates a representative for the "best interests" rather
than simply the "interests" of the child. This is an important distinc-
tion: A lawyer representing the interests of the child is a zealous ad-
vocate for the child's expressed wishes, representing the child the way
he would an adult client. A lawyer representing the "best interests" of
a child filters the child's wishes through the sieve of her own judg-
ment before presenting a position to the court. Essentially, she pre-
sents her own opinion of what is in the child's best interests to the
court.5
There has been much scholarly debate on whether interests or
"best interests" is the proper target for representation in dependency
proceedings. Emily Buss has noted that "[t]hose who advocate the
GAL [or best-interest] approach argue that children lack the maturity
of judgment, even the cognitive capacity of decision making, neces-
sary to assess. . their long-term interests. 5 6 In addition, "children
are under tremendous pressure to [misrepresent] their own inter-
ests-pressure from their families, from the court process, and from
52 Michelle Markowitz, Is a Lawyer Who Represents the "Best Interests" Really the Best for Pennsyl-
vania's Children?, 64 U. PITr. L. REv. 615, 625 (2003).
See id. at 626 (arguing that CASA programs provide better training than the Legal Aid or-
ganizations that supply GALs and law guardians in most states).
See Mandelbaum, supra note 47, at 86.
See generally Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their
Lauyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699 (1996) (evaluating the pros and cons of both tradi-
tional interests-oriented lawyers and best-interest GALs); Markowitz, supra note 52 (critiquing
the Pennsylvania GAL statute from a perspective favoring adversarial representation); Jean Koh
Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protec-
tive Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1505 (1996) (arguing that best interests are best deter-
mined through a traditional lawyer-client role).
See, e.g., Buss, supra note 55, at 1702.
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the circumstances" that led them to court.57 Lastly, those who prefer
a GAL approach argue that, in a chronically inadequate and under-
funded child-welfare system, courts need children's lawyers to present
all available information; a best-interests lawyer would be in a better
position to present the whole picture than a traditional advocate, who
might withhold information adverse to her case.58
Advocates of an interests, or "traditional lawyer," approach, em-
phasize "that it is the judge.., who is responsible for determining the
child's best interests., 59 The ordinary adversarial model is designed
to provide the judge with the necessary information to make that de-
60termination. Further, "giving children a voice in the [courtroom]
empowers [them]" to participate in the critical decisions being
made.6' Most practitioners adopt some mix of the two approaches,
reacting to the age and particular capacities of individual clients.
6
1
B. Constitutional Rights
1. Applying the Fourteenth Amendment to Children
Discussions of children's constitutional rights in scholarly litera-
ture virtually all begin with the landmark Supreme Court decision of
In re Gault.6 Gault announced that "neither the Fourteenth Amend-
ment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,"64 and "the condition
of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."6 5 Speaking through
Justice Fortas, the Court declared that juveniles are entitled to a vari-
ety of procedural protections.66 Courts must provide them timely,
written notice of allegations, counsel if liberty is at issue, protection
from self-incrimination, and the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine witnesses under oath.67 Subsequent cases have added guar-
antees of a reasonable-doubt standard and protection against double
jeopardy.8
57 Id. at 1702-03.
58 Id. at 1703.
59 Id.
CO Id. at 1703-04.
61 Id. at 1704.
62 Lawyers for Children, which represents many of Manhattan's foster-care children, inter-
prets the New York statute to call for "interest" representation; the Legal Aid Society, which
represents the rest, takes a "best interests" approach. Hal Silverman, Attorney in Charge of
Litij., Lawyers for Children, Brown Bag Lunch at Manhattan Family Court (June 20, 2005).
, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6 Id. at 13.
6 Id. at 28.
66 Id. at 33, 36-37, 49-50, 57.
67 Id.
68 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause,
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2, as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
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The ethos of Gault, with its sweeping dicta about the applicability
of the Fourteenth Amendment to juveniles, seems to argue for broad
procedural protection for children. The Supreme Court may have
been careful to circumscribe its holding: "We do not in this opinion
consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the total-
ity of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even
consider the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents."'69 Yet
Gault clearly applies the Fourteenth Amendment to juveniles, which
is an essential first step in locating a constitutional right to counsel
for children in foster care. Gault and the jurisprudence of constitu-
tional-criminal procedure have further relevance for children in fos-
ter care, because like juvenile criminal defendants, such children face
a literal loss of liberty and the possibility of residence in a state facil-
ity.
Gault nevertheless produces a strange result: children in the ju-
venile-justice system have more constitutional guarantees of proce-
dure than children in the child-welfare system. As demonstrated
above, children in juvenile court are afforded virtually all of the con-
stitutional protections afforded to their adult counterparts. But the
Supreme Court has not yet recognized a constitutional right to coun-
sel for children who are the subject of foster-care proceedings despite
the grave liberty interests at stake.
2. Procedural Due Process Property Interests
Any constitutional right to counsel for children in foster care must
be rooted in Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states
from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Procedural due process refers to the body of Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence that expounds upon what specific
adjudicative protections are invoked by "due process of law." As the
Southern District of New York explained, "[a] court analyzing a pro-
cedural due process claim first must determine whether plaintiffs
have a protected interest and, only then, must decide whether the
deprivation of that interest met with the requirements of due proc-
ess."7 The Supreme Court has said that "[t]he requirements of pro-
Clause, barred prosecution of a juvenile both in juvenile court and as an adult); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the reasonable-doubt standard for proving a criminal
charge against ajuvenile is constitutionally required).
. In reGault, 387 U.S. at 13.
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
71 Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), afftd, 126 F.3d
372 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam), and superseded &y statute, Child Abuse Prevention and Treat-
ment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, sec. 107, § 107, 110 Stat. 3063, 3071-74
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cedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encom-
passed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and
property. 0 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, locating a con-
stitutional right to counsel via a property rationale is problematic.
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents v. Roth explained
that a property interest exists where an individual has a legitimate
claim of entitlement grounded in nonconstitutional law, such as a
state statute:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilat-
eral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of enti-
tlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to pro-
tect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that
must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional
right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate
those claims.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Two years later, Judge Hufstedler of the Ninth Circuit explained this
requirement more concretely:
An entitlement is a legally enforceable interest in receiving a governmen-
tally conferred benefit, the initial receipt or the termination of which is
conditioned upon the existence of a controvertible and controverted
fact. Such an interest cannot be impaired or destroyed without prior no-
tice to the beneficiary and a meaningful opportunity for him to be heard
for the purpose of resolving the factual issue.
The Supreme Court has specifically declined to decide whether state
child-welfare statutes give rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement to
protective services,75 "which would enjoy due process protection
against state deprivation under... Roth.
''
7
6
(1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2000)), as recognized in Hilbert S. v. County
of Tioga, No. 3:03-CV-193, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29423, at *48-49 (N.D.N.Y.June 21, 2005).
72 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). For a discussion of what constitutes a
liberty interest, see infra Part IV.B.3.
73 Id. at 577; cf id. at 576 ("The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property
is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific bene-
fits.").
74 Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Fed'd Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 495-96 (9th Cir.
1974) (Hufstedler,J., dissenting).
71 One relevant case that predated Roth is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberglays
the theoretical framework for the argument that child-protective statutes do confer a legitimate
claim of entitlement and therefore a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Goldberg signaled in dicta that benefits previously thought of as "mere privileges" are af-
forded constitutional protection. Id. at 262 n.8. The Court announced that persons have a
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Lower courts have split on whether state child-welfare statutes give
rise to property interests.77  The variation in case outcomes results
partly from a difference in views concerning whether such statutes
ever can create property interests, partly from differences among the
statutory schemes, and partly from differences concerning the stage
of child-welfare proceedings.
a. Circuit Split
Reading the decisions broadly, one could fairly assert that the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as district courts in the Southern
District of Georgia, District of New Hampshire, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and Southern District of Mississippi, all have held that
there is a property interest in state child-welfare statutes. For exam-
right to due process with respect to governmental decisions that impose a "grievous loss" on
them. Id. at 262-63.
Goldberg seems to hinge on the fact that welfare benefits provide for fundamental human
needs, such as "the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care." Id. at
264. Children placed in foster care receive analogously essential benefits: the state provides
food, clothing, housing, and medical care. As decisions are made at foster-care reviews, it is
these fundamental benefits, deemed in Goldberg to be "property," which hang in the balance.
76 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 n.2 (1989); see also
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803 (2005) (noting that DeShaney left open
the question of whether restraining orders create an entitlement to police protection). De-
Shaney is a substantive due process case, whereas this comment is concerned with procedural
due process. DeShaney is worth mentioning because the Supreme Court clearly held that the
state has no affirmative duty to intervene to protect a child, even where the state is aware of
abuse in the home. The case can therefore be distinguished from the situation where a child is
already in foster care. Once the state has taken charge of a child voluntarily, different substan-
tive due process rights accrue. See supra note 7.
77 See Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting
lower courts are divided on this question), aft'd, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam), and
superseded by statute, Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-235, sec. 107, § 107, 110 Stat. 3063, 3071-74 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
5106a (2000)), as recognized in Hilbert S. v. County of Tioga, No. 3:03-CV-193, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29423, at *48-49 (N.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005).
78 See Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that
Kentucky child-protection statutes give plaintiffs "an entitlement to protective services of which
they may not be deprived without due process of law"); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818
F.2d 791, 799-800 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that children in foster care may "state a
claim based upon deprivation of a liberty interest.., when ... officials fail to follow" guidelines
mandated by the Georgia foster-care and placement scheme); Powell v. Dep't of Human Res.,
918 F. Supp. 1575, 1580-81 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (finding that the Georgia Child Abuse Protocol
.vests abused children with a[] [constitutionally protected] entitlement to procedures and pro-
tections mandated therein"); Eric L. ex rel. Schierberl v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303, 308 (D.N.H.
1994) (refusing to dismiss claims that the New Hampshire child-protection statute creates an
entitlement to certain services); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320, 335 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(mem.) (finding "an affirmative duty ... to provide. .. adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical
care and reasonable safety"), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43
F.3d 48 (1994).
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pie, the Sixth Circuit held that there is such an interest in Meador v.
Cabinet for Human Resources.
Kentucky law provides that "[t] he cabinet shall arrange for a program of
care, treatment and rehabilitation of the children committed to it," and
that "the cabinet shall be responsible for the operation, management and
development of the existing state facilities for the custodial care and re-
habilitation of children .... We find that these statutes give the Meador
children an entitlement to protective services of which they may not be
deprived without due process of law. 9
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit and, strangely, the Sixth Circuit, as
well as the Western District of Michigan and Southern District of New
York, have all refused to recognize a property interest in child-welfare
statutes.80 For example, in Child v. Beame, the Southern District of
New York held that there is no property right in a child's interest in
being adopted."' To a certain extent, therefore, there is an irrecon-
cilable circuit split on the question of whether finding a property in-
terest is appropriate.
b. Statutory Distinctions
Differences in state statutes are another explanation for the dis-
parity; some state child-welfare statutes may confer a "legitimate claim
of entitlement," while others do not. In Powell v. Department of Human
Resources, the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held
that "the [Richmond County Child Abuse] Protocol"2 vests abused
children with an entitlement to the procedures and protection man-
dated therein. Thus, an abused child may not be deprived of these
procedures and protection without procedural due process.", 3 Simi-
79 Meador, 902 F.2d at 476-77 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 605.100 (LexisNexis 1999
repi.)).
See Tony L. ex rel. Simpson v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1185 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
property interests have no application to enforcement of child-protection statutes); Doe ex rel.
Nelson v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that Wisconsin child-
abuse-reporting statutes do not vest plaintiffs with a constitutionally protected property inter-
est); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1396-98 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (mem.) (finding no constitu-
tionally protected liberty or property interest created by the Illinois child-welfare statute); Child
v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 603-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that plaintiffs have no constitu-
tionally protected property interest in permanent adoptive placement). For an explanation of
the Sixth Circuit's distinction between Meador, where it recognizes the interest, and Tony L.,
where it does not, see infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
81 Child, 412 F. Supp. at 605 (holding that neither federal nor state statutes on adoption con-
fer an entitlement that amounts to a property right).
82 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-15-2 (2004) (mandating the creation of a similar protocol for each
county).
83 Powell, 918 F. Supp. at 1581. The court in Powell applied a Roth property analysis:
In determining whether the state law creates a protected liberty interest, the court must
examine whether the state has imposed specific substantive limitations on the discretion
of the state officers or employees such that their duties are of a mandatory character. If
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larly, in Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, the Eleventh Circuit found
that plaintiff foster children had a procedural due process claim
based on entitlements conferred by Section 49-5-3(12) of the Georgia
Code .
But in Coker ex rel. Coker v. Henry, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan distinguished Michigan's child-
welfare statute85 from that of Georgia:
[T]he Georgia statutory scheme required state officials to protect chil-
dren in their custody, thoroughly investigate foster homes, supervise
children in foster homes through visits made at regular intervals, and fol-
low established guidelines. Indeed, reference to the Georgia statutory
:scheme ... reveals its terms are substantially more explicit and manda-
tory than those of the Michigan Child Protection Law. The Michigan
Child Protection law does not prescribe and mandate compliance with
specific procedures substantively limiting the discretion of state officers.
It is not sufficiently explicit and mandatory and does not create a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement.86
The court thus concluded, feasibly, that the difference is based on
the statutes themselves.
c. Distinctions Based on the Stage of Proceedings
Yet a third way to reconcile the body of cases concerns the circum-
stances under which the child brings the claim: perhaps a property
interest does not exist during the initial investigation but rather ac-
crues once the child has been placed in foster care. In DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court
made this distinction: "Had the state by the affirmative exercise of its
power removed Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster
home operated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently
analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an af-
firmative duty to protect., 87 Underlying the property decisions may
not, the plaintiff cannot have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the interest, but only a
unilateral expectation of it.
Id. at 1580. This is clearly the language of the Roth property test. Yet, based on this analysis, the
court concludes that dependent children have a liberty interest in the procedures and protec-
tions of the Richmond County Child Abuse Protocol. The court is mistaken. The Supreme
Court's analysis of liberty in Roth discusses not statutory entitlements, but a broad, constitution-
ally-based definition of liberty. The court seemingly meant to conclude that the Georgia law-
makers imbued abused children with a property interest.
84 818 F.2d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 1987). As the Powell court did, the court concludes that the
children have a "liberty interest," yet bases the argument on a Roth property analysis of the rele-
vant Georgia statute.
85 Michigan Child Protection Law, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 722.621-638 (2002 & Supp. 2006).
813 F. Supp. 567, 570 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (mem.), affd, 25 F.3d 1047 (6th Cir. 1994) (un-
published table decision).
87 489 U.S. 189,201 n.9 (1989).
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be a similar notion that a child does not have a property right to fos-
ter care when living in his biological parents' home without state su-
pervision. Once the state gives foster care to a child, however, some
courts might argue that it cannot deprive the child of the care with-
out providing some sort of process. Therefore a child might not have
a property interest in care at the initial hearing, when ajudge decides
whether to place the child in care, but might nevertheless have a
property interest thereafter. This approach is consonant with the
law's general hesitation to find an affirmative duty to act. The Court,
in its substantive due process jurisprudence, has consistently refused
to find state child-welfare a encies liable for failing to intervene in
dangerous family situations. It has, however, found the state liable
where a child suffers abuse while in state care.89
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is not clear
whether children have a property interest in foster care. Read to-
gether, the lower court decisions either signal a circuit split, variation
among state statutes, or a bright-line moment in the proceeding
when a property interest accrues. It is not property so much as liberty
that is at stake when a child enters foster care and when a foster-care
placement is reviewed because, " [i] n a Constitution for a free people,
there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad
indeed."90
3. Procedural Due Process Liberty Interests
Under Supreme Court doctrine, a liberty interest can also trigger
due process protections.9' A liberty interest need not be grounded in
nonconstitutional law, as required for a property interest; it can be
based in the Constitution itself.9 2 As the Supreme Court recently ex-
plained, "[a] liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by
reason of guarantees implicit in the word 'liberty.' ' 93 "Liberty" refers
to many different freedoms and rights, including the right to be free
88 See generally Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803 (2005) (finding that a
wife did not have a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her
husband). DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not re-
quire a state or local government to protect its citizens from private violence not attributed to
its employees).
89 Griffith v.Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1438 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that, when children are
in foster care, the state has an affirmative duty to provide for their basic needs and is liable for
failure to do so).
90 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
91 See id. at 571-72 (stating that one of the great constitutional concepts is that procedural
due process protects against "deprivation of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints im-
posed by the criminal process").
92 See id. at 577.
93 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
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from bodily restraint, the right to contract, the right "to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, [the right] to acquire useful
knowledge," and the right to "enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
",94
men.
With Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, the Northern District of Geor-
gia became the first federal court to announce that children have "a
fundamental liberty interest at stake in deprivation and [termination-
of-parental-rights] 9 proceedings. 96 The court stated that the subject
child's liberty interest includes "[an] interest in his or her own safety,
health, and well-being, as well as an interest in maintaining the integ-
rity of the family unitand in having a relationship with his or her bio-
logical parents."97 The court argued that an erroneous decision that a
child is not being abused or neglected can have the most serious ef-
fect on a child, leading to chronic abuse or even death. Conversely
an erroneous decision that a child is being abused or neglected
would lead to the unnecessary destruction of the child's most impor-
tant family relationships. 9
The court also pointed out that foster-care proceedings pose a lit-
eral threat to a child's physical liberty." In fact, child-welfare bureau-
crats in some states, including Georgia, routinely place normal chil-
dren in institutions designed for children suffering from emotional
or behavioral problems "because suitable family foster homes are not
available."' 10 Such a situation clearly invokes due process protection.
It is precisely such a threatened loss of liberty that distinguishes foster
care from other civil contexts in which the Supreme Court has re-
fused to recognize a constitutionally protected right to counsel. For
example, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court
refused to find a universal constitutional right to counsel for parents
in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, holding instead that
the right to counsel could be determined on a case-by-case basis.' °'
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
95 A child-welfare agency brings an action for termination of parental rights when the
agency believes it is in the child's best interests to free him for adoption. If the agency is suc-
cessful, the parents' fights are terminated and a caregiver approved by the state may adopt the
child. See Gelles & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 97.
96 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005). See generaUy Herbert, supra note 25, at A21
(lambasting the state of Mississippi for not devoting enough resources to protecting children in
the state).
97 Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1360-61 ("[F]oster children in state custody are subject to placement in a wide array
of different types of foster care placements, including institutional facilities where their physical
liberty is greatly restricted.").
100 Id. at 1361.
lot 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
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Because of the inherent discretion in awarding counsel on a case-by-
case basis, a case-by-case right to counsel is barely preferable to no
right to counsel at all.
In Lassiter, petitioner Abby Gail Lassiter's son was removed by So-
cial Services and placed in foster care for want of proper medical
care. 0 2 A year after the boy went into care, Lassiter was sentenced to
twenty-five to forty years for second-degree murder.0 3 A couple of
years later, the Department brought a petition to terminate Lassiter's
parental rights to her son because she had not made the minimal ef-
forts towards reunification required by state law. 4
The trial court terminated Lassiter's parental rights.' 5 The state
court of appeals affirmed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 106 The Supreme Court of the United States
"granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's claim under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" that she was entitled
to counsel as an indigent in a termination-of-parental-rights proceed-
ing. 
7
In refusing to find such a constitutionally-protected right to coun-
sel for all indigent parents, the Supreme Court explained in dicta
that a liberty-interest analysis precludes such a right:
[T]he Court's precedents speak with one voice about what "fundamental
fairness" has meant when the Court has considered the right to ap-
pointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses,
he may be deprived of his physical liberty. It is against this presumption
that all the other elements in the due process decision must be meas-
ured.' 0
It is on the grounds of physical liberty that a child's interest in a ter-
mination-of-parental-rights hearing, or any other type of foster-care
proceeding, is distinct from his parent's interest. True, a parent's
right to her child is fundamental, and the Supreme Court recognized
the gravity of termination in Lassiter. Referring to termination of pa-
rental rights, the Court wrote, "If the State prevails, it will have
worked a unique kind of deprivation. A parent's interest in the accu-
racy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status
is, therefore, a commanding one., 09
102 Id. at 20-21.
103 Id. at 20.
104 Id. at 20-21.
105 Id. at 24.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 26-27.
109 Id. at 27 (internal citations omitted).
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But the Court's right-to-counsel jurisprudence was contingent
upon a physical threat to liberty, which is absent for the parent in a
termination-of-parental-rights context. The child, by contrast, faces
the requisite loss of liberty. A child entering foster care might not be
placed in a single-family home. A child may well enter a congregate-
care facility or state hospital, wherein his liberty would indeed be re-
stricted."°
In Kenny A., the Northern District of Georgia noted that "a child's
liberty interests continue to be at stake" beyond the initial proceed-
ing.' When the child is in state custody, a "special relationship" ex-
ists, which establishes "rights to reasonably safe living conditions and
services necessary to ensure protection from physical, psychological,
and emotional harm.""12 "Thus," the court concludes, "a child's fun-
damental liberty interests are at stake not only in the initial depriva-
tion hearing but also in the series of hearings and review proceedings
that occur ... once a child comes into state custody."1
3
4. Mathews v. Eldridge: Determining What Process is Due
Once a liberty interest has been established, a court must then ask
"what process is constitutionally required to safeguard those inter-
ests."" The Georgia court in Kenny A. applied the test outlined by
the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, which weighs three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
5
The Kenny A. court concluded that the plaintiff foster children have a
constitutional right to counsel under the due process clause of the
Georgia Constitution, which mirrors that of the Federal Constitu-
tion.
110 It would be possible to make the child's right to counsel contingent on the outcome of a
foster-care proceeding. Most people would probably view placement in a state hospital or ag-
gregate-care facility as more of a restriction on liberty than placement in a single-family home.
Awarding counsel on the basis of outcome would parallel Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding that there is no right to counsel if there
is only the chance of imprisonment, but there is a guarantee if imprisonment actually occurs).
Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
116 Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
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As to the first prong, the private interest affected, the Court reit-
erated "the child's fundamental liberty interests in health, safety, and
family integrity," and the risk of institutional placement.' 7 The court
concluded that these liberty interests are sufficiently grave to merit "a
due process right to counsel in [abuse and neglect] proceedings."",
Second, the court found that there is a sufficient risk of erroneous
deprivation of the private liberty interest to satisfy the Mathews test."9
The court pointed out that the standards employed by juvenile courts
in deprivation proceedings provide wide latitude for judicial discre-
tion, and thus for subjectivity. 2 ° Such imprecise standards enhance
the risk of erroneous fact-finding. 12 1 The court also noted strong em-
pirical evidence that the Georgia Department of Family- and Chil-
dren's Services routinely "makes erroneous decisions ... that affect
the safety and welfare of foster children.'
2
The court next assessed the probable value that appointment of
counsel would entail. The court rejected defendants' argument that
juvenile judges, CASAs, and citizen-review panels serve as adequate
protection and concluded that "only the appointment of counsel can
effectively mitigate the risk of significant errors" in child welfare pro-
ceedings. 2 3  The court based this finding on the characteristics of
each of these groups. First, a juvenile court judge, unlike a lawyer,
cannot conduct his own investigation and is thus dependent on facts
presented in the courtroom. 24 The judge's opinions, therefore, "are
only as [reliable] as the information provided to [him]," largely by
child welfare agencies. 12 5 Next, the court concluded that CASA repre-
sentation is inherently limited by the fact that CASAs are not lawyers
117 Id.
11 Id. at 1361 (emphasis added).
119 Id.
120 Id.; see also In re Z.B., 556 S.E.2d 234, 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("In determining how the
interest of the child is best served, the juvenile court is vested with a broad discretion which will
not be controlled in the absence of manifest abuse.").
The latitude afforded family court judges in Georgia is typical of states across the country.
As noted above, social reformers wanted family court (andjuvenilejustice court) to be a service-
based, civil program, rather than a criminal court. See supra note 9. There is thus an inherent
tension between the flexibility necessary to accommodate a social-service approach on one
hand and the danger ofjudicial arbitrariness on the other.
Interestingly, the judicial subjectivity the court points to in order to support a liberty interest
is the same subjectivity that weighs against the legitimacy of the claim of entitlement necessary
for a property interest. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
121 See Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. at 1361 ("[I]mprecise substantive standards that leave determi-
nations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge serve to magnify the risk of errone-
ous factfinding." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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and cannot provide legal representation for their charges.12 6 Fur-
thermore, CASAs are appointed in few cases and cannot be counted
upon for system-wide representation. 1
7
Lastly, the court weighed the government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens en-
tailed. 2 8 The function at issue is that of the state as parens patriae, or
the role of the state in caring for those who cannot care for them-
selves.29 Essentially the doctrine is based in the notion that "the state
has a legitimate interest in protecting.., individuals [who cannot]
protect themselves." 0 The court held once again that only through
legal representation throughout foster-care proceedings can the gov-
ernment effectively exercise its parens patriae power.1 3 ' The court held
that "it is in the state's interest, as well as the child's, to require the
appointment of a child advocate attorney" and that "[tihis funda-
mental interest far outweighs any fiscal or administrative burden that
a right to appointed counsel may entail.' 32
The child advocate has a strong argument in alleging a liberty in-
terest that invokes due process protections. The Supreme Court has
defined liberty broadly, and the Kenny A. court convincingly argued
that children facing, and in, foster care have a liberty interest that
mandates constitutional protection. It is less clear whether foster-
care statutes create a legitimate claim of entitlement sufficient to sat-
isfy Roth and thus qualify as property meriting constitutional protec-
tion. The Supreme Court should recognize this liberty interest as the
Kenny A. court did. The reasoning is sound and consistent with the
Court's current jurisprudence. Furthermore, the policy imperative
must be heeded. Children all over the country are suffering in in-
adequate and inappropriate childcare placements. Mandating coun-
sel will not fix broken foster-care systems-surely that requires action
by the various state legislatures-but it is an essential and legally-
cognizable step.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
19 Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004)).
1"0 Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d 821, 825 n.5 (Ga. 1982)).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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